Small-State Security, as Defined by Thucydides

By: Chloe Hornbostel de Moura e Silva

Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s article, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,” critiques Eurocentric notions of international security. The piece challenges current frameworks of the field for their reverence of great power relations, which will be defined in this paper as the mutual interaction between two states of significant influence in the global system. This analysis will outline how “explanatory and political” issues within international security hold an inherent bias that focuses on great powers. The authors first define Eurocentrism as a leading tenet of development studies, which ascribes high importance to Western ideals of development and modernization. The text goes on to claim that the main schools of international relations (IR) thought, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism, center around a racist and power-centric structure that idealizes the West.

The issue with these frameworks of state-state relations of power and structure lies in the marginalization of smaller states as “side effects” of great power politics. IR scholar Stanley Hoffman writes that modern IR has begun to “take an ‘Athenian’ perspective on the world,” embracing concepts of great power security similar to those espoused in Thucydides’ account of the war between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. Barkawi and Laffey compare current security studies to those of ancient Greece, both of which place dominant states (characterized by Westernism and Eurocentrism) at the center of research. This dynamic inevitably promotes the reproduction and idealization of great power security and politics while imposing a scientific study of IR that is significantly skewed in favor of powerful actors. 

Barkawi and Laffey underscore that traditional security studies place major powers, historically Eurocentric and Western in nature, at the center of research and innovation. This paper elaborates on this concept by evaluating the extent to which Thucydides frames concepts of international security that consider and empower smaller-state security. He does this by describing speeches and figures that detail state security as applied to minor powers, typically found on the outskirts of great power relations. Scholars often engage with the Ancient Greek war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians in contemporary applications to standing power hierarchies. In his account of the war in The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, Thucydides goes beyond this common perception and instead outlines the importance of smaller-state relations to a holistic view of security studies. His critiques highlight the importance of smaller states within the international hierarchy, specifically concerning political agency and justice. At the war’s end, the support of the minor powers was instrumental to the Peloponnesian defeat of Athens. 

The subsequent analysis will describe the ways in which Thucydidean concepts of international security, stemming from Thucydides’ account of great power war, also present an opportunity for the study of smaller-state security.  The first section will outline the concept of alliances and federations in which smaller states seek stability and security by joining with greater powers. The second section will consider the international hierarchy of weaker and stronger states and their mutually reliant relationship. The third section will expand on concepts of alliances and hierarchies by evaluating the extent to which smaller states can or cannot advocate for justice in the global system. The final section will explore the value of each of these themes to the survival of small states. Given these considerations, what traits or placements of minor powers within the international system enforce or diminish their agency and sovereignty? As a whole, the paper affirms Barkawi and Laffey’s claim that “the weak play an integral role in shaping world politics.”

An additional consideration throughout the paper is the role of hope and fear in war. Hope and fear are prominent elements within the nature of war, meaning they remain consistent in its very fabric. The war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians in 400 B.C.E. is no different. Hope and fear are consistently present throughout Thucydides’ account, particularly in considerations of smaller states on the periphery of the war. An assessment of smaller-state relations and security, as outlined in this paper, requires acknowledging the heightened measures of hope and fear within insecure states. IR scholar Mohammed Ayoob defines insecure states in relation to internal and external vulnerabilities that pose a threat to the state and regime. Because of their insecurity and weakness, small states are more likely to lack the resources needed to fight a war that could advocate for their needs, placing them back at an equal or inferior security level stemming from hope and fear. Ayoob considers the most insecure states to be those with the highest levels of vulnerability, a term he defines to describe a state’s risk to “weakened state structures” or “governing regimes” due to internal or external factors. While all states experience hope and fear in conflict, smaller states are generally more susceptible to these factors. In this way, the cycle of hope and fear within insecure states becomes infinite, making it a pertinent theme throughout all 21 years of the war. 

Alliances and Federations

In the early years of the conflict, Archidamus addresses the Plataeans on how they should engage with the Athenian and Spartan allies if they do not join Sparta in its fight against Athenian expansion. He suggests that, in choosing not to align with Sparta, the Plataeans should “not side with either party” and “treat both as friends and neither as enemies.” This suggestion is similar to the modern concept of state neutrality, a stance taken when a state is either incapable of aligning with one side or unable to protect itself from potential invasion by a major opposing power. Such instances of imposed state neutrality diminish the autonomy of minor powers regarding political positioning. Alliances and relationships with greater powers often establish an expectation of aligned perspectives, detracting from the agency of sovereign states within the global system. A global system that follows a Eurocentric view of IR, then, inaccurately represents what should be a diverse marketplace of ideas. If partnership with dominant states requires political alignment, it is only a matter of time until the only ideas represented in the global system are those of great powers. 

After the Greeks originally freed Plataea from Persia, the Spartan Pausanias granted Plataea independence, sovereignty, and the freedom to occupy land. The guidelines of their independence further dictated that any attack on the Plataeans would yield a defensive response from their allies, a provision initially created to repay the Plataeans’ “courage and commitment” in supporting the Spartan cause. Years later, however, Archidamus approached Plataea with the intention to enslave its people under Sparta. The Plataeans had since entered into an alliance with the Athenians, who had promised their aid in protecting Plataea from Archidamus’ invasion. After years of living in safety, the Plataeans feared for their independence and sovereignty in a clear breach of agreement by the Spartans. Their formal alliance with Athens, however, was also unfruitful. The Athenians, citing their alliance with the Plataeans and their previous protection of Plataean territory, promised aid against the Spartan invasion. However, distracted by other military endeavors, Athens failed to uphold its vow, and Plataea was forced to surrender to Sparta. 

This failure presents another issue within smaller-state alliances in international security. Alliances, when involving two powerful states, are generally stable and secure. Take the alliance between the United States and France under NATO, for example – a breach of the alliance by either party would be highly improbable for two reasons. First, great powers, with their abundant resources and means of production, rely on each other heavily. Additionally, each great power has its own allies and partnerships, making each, as individual states, even more powerful. This security does not apply equally to minor powers in an alliance. The fall of Plataea, despite its alliance with Athens and promised independence by Sparta, illustrates the insecure and exploitative nature of agreements between great powers and smaller states. 

Two additional considerations illustrate the nature of small-state alliances throughout the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians: the means by which small states enter into alliances and the maintenance of positive global perceptions of powerful states. Both factors challenge Eurocentric views of IR and their omission of discussions on small-state security, instead highlighting small-state dynamics as equally important to holistic considerations of a global system. The Mytilenaeans, as a weaker state, made two comments to the Spartans on their former alliance with the Athenians that exemplify these factors. First, they claimed that the nature of their partnership had been “more by fear than friendship,” which had resulted in alliance tension between the Athenians and the Mytilenaeans. The nature of their alliance proposal, according to the Mytilenaeans, originally lay in an Athenian bid for support and a Mytilenaean hope for peace. 

While alliances can generally measure the extent to which states feel secure as standalone entities in the global system, Thucydides underscores that alliances born of fear can be insecure. As a general rule, international matters of great urgency and fear can quickly become less so, altering the context in which the alliance exists. If this were to happen, the Athenians would find it easier to no longer honor their partnership with the Mytilenaeans, a factor that could lead them to breach binding clauses that may no longer benefit them as the stronger state. In turn, such factors made a proposal of this nature unattractive to the Mytilenaeans. 

States must exercise caution to be sure that a swift entry into an alliance, born of urgency, does not later make the alliance prone to distrust. This dynamic is further destabilized when it applies to strong state alliances with smaller states – weaker states could at one moment provide a great power with timely advantages (territorial, army power, etc.) that may no longer be useful later on. Born out of fear, the dissolution of such an alliance leaves the two actors in very different positions. It is easier for great powers to wean off a relationship that merely added to their global advantage. Small states, however, are often left insecure after growing dependent on the great power ally. In this way, quick entry into and exit from these alliances can be detrimental and affirm the Mytilenaean comment on unstable alliances. 

Another factor involved in alliances between weaker and stronger states is the global image of stronger states. The Mytilenaeans claimed that, by entering into an alliance with them, Sparta would be “seen to be both defending those who need [their] defence and at the same time harming [their] enemies.” With war comes the need for a state to differentiate its unique policy, strategy, and culture as perceived by other states. Perceptions of a state’s grand strategy, in turn, play a significant role in how other states engage with it. The Mytilenaeans highlighted this tendency and hinted at deeper motivations of state fear behind strong states’ entry into alliances with weaker ones. In a war deeply dependent on the Greek world’s acceptance of Sparta and Athens, one of which would ultimately emerge as the leading state among the Greeks, external perception of the state was valuable and born of competitive fear. Additionally, a positive external image increases the potential for new alliances and sets the tone for great power occupation and operations throughout the Greek world. The Mytilenaeans appealed to this strategy when suggesting that the Spartans ally with them, acknowledging they may not have much to offer beyond a boost in global image. 

Hierarchy of the Weak and Strong

As it exists today, the global system consists of hierarchies of power that have been reinforced through imbalanced relationships since their inception. Alliances, as discussed in the first portion of the paper, not only follow present structures of power difference but also reinforce them. I argue that hierarchies of power follow Dr. Lise Howard’s definition within international security, building on the Waltzian structure of survival under realism. IR theorist Kenneth Waltz defines hierarchies of power as an effect of state survival. Waltz’s definition, since it focuses on those states capable of confronting one another for survival, fits Barkawi and Laffey’s outline of Eurocentric notions of IR, which center around major powers and their relations. Dr. Lise Howard expands on the IR concept of power relations to include a three-branch definition of power, built on induction, coercion, and persuasion. Dr. Howard’s definition builds on that of Robert Dahl and defines power as the ability of state A to induce, coerce, or persuade state B to act in a way it would not have otherwise, to the benefit of state A. Therefore, the ability of a state to mobilize the resources and influence necessary to sway another state directly measures its power in the global system. These measurements of power build the hierarchy of the weak and strong and dictate interstate relations accordingly.

Interstate relations, according to the hierarchy, often revolve around the needs and comfort of strong states. IR theorist Edward Said most famously highlights this in his study of postcolonial IR, a theory that frames the global hierarchy in ways that acknowledge the enduring effects of colonialism. Said claims that formerly colonized small states are caught in a cycle that enforces conformity to norms and expectations of cultural behavior imposed by major powers (“Edward”). Given the persistent cycle of postcolonial structure, small states are often kept in a financially dependent relationship with historically leading powers. To maintain this relationship, small states conform to imposed structures and stereotypes that keep the great powers equally reliant on them. In turn, a hierarchy of postcolonial structure can illustrate the extent to which weak states and major powers rely on each other. Great power strategy keeps weak states in subordination, perpetuating the hierarchy in relationships of interdependence. 

At the war’s onset, Corcyra proposed an alliance with Athens. The state appealed to Athenian advantage and strength in suggesting why an alliance would be beneficial to Athens as a military power gearing to face the Peloponnesians. Their appeal focused on keeping Athens as a strong power well-perceived in the global system, and in doing so, keeping Corcyra a weak, reliant power. The decision was made as follows. At the time, Athens and the Peloponnese were in a truce. However, Athens was in the process of preparing for a war they believed would involve and encompass the entire Greek world–their decisions regarding alliances and IR at this point focused on most adequately preparing for such an endeavor. Athens considered the extent to which an alliance with Corcyra would pin the state against Corinth, a move that would weaken both. In this way, a potential war between Athens and Corinth would pose a lesser threat to the Athenians.

The conditions of the Athenian agreement to an alliance with Corcyra also fell short of a completely mutually beneficial partnership. Because of this, entry into the partnership inherently reinforced Corcyra’s weakness and Athens’ strength in the hierarchy. Markedly, the alliance between the two states was not considered a “full alliance,” “where they would recognise the same friends and enemies.” In this way, Athens was able to weaken Corcyra and eliminate it as a threat while also protecting itself from any military commitments that may arise from an otherwise “full” alliance. The agreement was considered to best serve the Athenians, keeping Corcyra in a subordinate position and further perpetuating the hierarchy. 

Additionally, the establishment of the Delian League depicts the gradual consolidation of power under a hierarchical structure. Initially, a conglomerate of states formed to protect the Greek world from Persia; the alliance came to be led by Athens. Given certain responsibilities and influence over the states, Athens rose to power by means they claimed were originally protective in nature, later admitting to being driven by “honour” and “self-interest.” Athens described its assumption of power as a product of necessary protection–they outlined that their control over the league was born of collective “fear” among the Greeks. As “protectors” of the Greek world, they framed their rise to power as a necessary condition for the collective’s security. Athens delineated a hierarchy of Greek states that positioned Athens as the great power by necessity, categorizing any claim against this as detrimental to the security of Greece as a whole.

The hierarchy was reinforced when Athens forced the revolting Naxians to remain in the league, which had since become an empire under the Athenians. Thucydides wrote that not only were the Naxians prevented from voicing opposition to the expanding Athenian rule, but that they were also “forced back into compliance by a siege.” What had originally been an alliance for collective security against the Persians became a hierarchy engineered to keep Athens at the top. In fact, Thucydides notes that “[Naxos] was the first allied city to be enslaved, in contravention of established practice.” A similar subordination of other states by the Athenians followed. Athens, as a great power, had the ability to define and reinforce a hierarchy that worked in its favor, facing ever-diminishing consequences as it did so. Great powers, similarly, are able to continue patterns of conquest due to norms in the global system, strengthening existing hierarchies and binding smaller states to hierarchical conditions.

Similarly, Hermocrates’ address to the Sicilian public illustrates how campaigns for collective security often take precedence over individual representation, further solidifying the global hierarchy. In a desperate speech to the Sicilians, Hermocrates urged the public to set aside differences and concerns in forming a united front against the Athenians. Civil strife, for one, is very often the means by which insecure states voice concerns of misrepresentation or disagreement within a system. Hermocrates categorized civil strife as “the overriding cause of ruin” for Sicily, underscoring it as the reason for the state’s instability. As a powerful leader, he discouraged individual thought and revolutionary action, thus also dissuading weakened voices from advocacy. He further outlines that punishment and disappointment follow advocates seeking to reform the system, reinforcing a negative notion of activism with regard to the overall strength of the Sicilian state. These relationships preserve alliances that work in favor of great powers and their needs, reinforcing these states’ metrics of power and exerting perpetually greater influence within the global system 

A Mission Towards Justice

Scholarship typically defines justice as the fair treatment of entities whose well-being is somehow tied to just practice. The Melian dialogue provides a deep analysis of justice as interpreted by weak and strong states, as well as the rhetoric involved in appealing to each side. In the sixteenth year of the war, Athens and Melos convened on themes of equity and strength with respect to the siege of Melos. Athens, in setting up the dialogue, provided a definition of justice which takes into account Athenian power within the Greek system and the Melians’ lack thereof. The Athenians proposed that “in the human sphere judgements about justice are relevant only between those with an equal power to enforce it, and that the possibilities are defined by what the strong do and the weak accept.” This claim outlines a notion of justice that centers on great powers rather than insecure small states, whose rights are more likely to be infringed upon. The Athenian view propagates a Eurocentric notion of justice, providing an opportunity to critique equity as it exists in the current global order. 

In claiming that topics of justice are only “relevant” when discussed between states “with an equal power to enforce it,” it is necessary to first define what constitutes these “relevant” states. By requiring that a state have the ability to enforce just treatment as required by laws or global norms, this also requires them to have the resources and influence necessary to do so. Since strong states are generally considered to have the greatest access to resources and influence within the global system, the Athenian definition of justice restricts conversations and decisions surrounding it purely to these states. Throughout history, great powers have colonized and exploited smaller states to their own benefit. Tying this to the aforementioned definition of just practice as bound to well-being, weaker states are the ones most typically in need of outreach based on principles of justice. By restricting discussions on the topic purely to powerful states, the Athenians exclude genuine expressions of need and limit great power accountability within the system. As Athens’ rise to power continues, it is evident that it is not concerned with either of these principles. A global system inclusive of smaller-state security, however, would advocate for genuine communication and accountability within discussions of justice. 

Furthermore, Athens claims that guidelines for just treatment are defined by “what the strong do and the weak accept.” At this point, Athens has forcefully invaded Melos and superficially allowed the Melians to engage in a conversation on justice despite their status as a weaker state. Athens, in imposing its military agenda against Melos, directly assigns itself as the “strong” and Melos as the “weak.” The claim introduces an uncomfortable reality about equity as it presently exists in the international system. Reiterating Dr. Howard’s definition, powerful states are defined by their ability to persuade, influence, or coerce other states to act in ways beneficial to them. Applying this definition to the Athenian concept of justice, great powers are so named because of their ability to impose agendas of power on other states. Consequently, great power infractions on justice are limitless–they remain infinitely disruptive in following the ability of a powerful state to impose and the willingness of small states to accept. 

Contemporary dynamics of justice within the international system mirror the Athenian definition of the term. In this way, Thucydides’ description of injustice in Ancient Greece also serves as a wake-up call to an exploitative dynamic that remains pervasive today. Alliances, power structures, and hierarchies are built around the freedom of leading states to exercise force as part of grand strategy and the complacency of minor powers in serving some purpose within this structure. Whether this purpose is based on natural resources, territory, or labor, smaller states remain at the mercy of major powers for their role in the world system. An approach based in smaller-state security, on the contrary, would incorporate all states equally into this process. It would acknowledge the contributions of both great and minor powers to the global system, distributing justice as acknowledged, decided, and agreed upon by all states. 

This vision of agreement among all states may cause leading states to conceivably lose some of their power by accommodating the needs of smaller states. At another point in the same dialogue, the Melians suggested to the Athenians that their relationship could be based on friendship as opposed to animosity. To this, the Athenians replied that rivalry between the two states is more beneficial than friendship. They claimed that friendship “would be taken by [their] subjects as a sign of weakness on [their] part, while [the Melians’] hatred is a sign of [Athenian] strength.”  This perception is a considerable obstacle to true justice for weaker states and one that illustrates Waltz’s security dilemma as it applies to fairness across the global system. The security dilemma claims that states engage with one another in a fight for survival, a concept that mutually excludes the simultaneous security of two states. In alignment with the security dilemma, the Athenian definition of justice posits that smaller states must be placed at a disadvantage in order for great powers to remain secure in the global system. 

Small-State Advocacy

In outlining the various ways in which leading states build and reinforce power hierarchies within the international community, it is also important to note how weaker states respond and advocate for their own security. By highlighting a number of small-state speeches throughout the text, Thucydides conveys their perspectives while grappling with a system disproportionately skewed in favor of great powers. While often unfruitful, the ability of small states to recognize injustice within the hierarchy and delineate the reasons for which justice should be distributed is an important aspect of smaller-state security that stands out from Eurocentric notions. By moving past the distinct hierarchy of the weak and the strong, Thucydides introduces a concept of smaller-state security that empowers their voices within the hierarchy. While it does not alter the hierarchy’s structure, Thucydides’ mention of their advocacy creates ripples within its flow. This disruption encourages the reader to draw their own conclusions about justice as it exists in the ancient system. 

The Corcyraean appeal to Athens for an alliance has been described in this paper as an illustration of the persistent, cyclic nature of power structures. The Corcyraeans’ advocacy of their needs, however, engages Athens in a conversation about justice that extends beyond the Athenian military agenda. In an assembly between Athenian and Corcyraean officials, a Corcyraean identifies two hindrances faced by smaller states given their nature as weaker players in the global system. First, the Corcyraean notes that his people exist as “[those] who go to their neighbours asking for help,” as weaker states often must, and as “hav[ing] no prior claim on them from some great service rendered” (since weaker states’ lack of resources often makes them unable to provide services to other states that could later be reciprocated). The speaker follows this description with the weaker state’s need to outline both the advantages of an alliance to the great power and the permanence of the weaker state’s gratitude to the stronger state. In this way, the Corcyraean disrupts typical notions of an ingrained hierarchy, introducing a consideration of justice that highlights the ability of a hierarchy to detract from state actors’ agency.

In their dialogue with the Athenians, the Melians courageously underscore the disadvantage of smaller states when forced to counter great power strategy. The Melians highlight their belief that “a person placed at risk should always be entitled to fairness and justice and should have the benefit of the doubt, even if their case is not quite fully demonstrated.” In this discussion of justice, the Melians position weaker powers at the center of security dynamics originally engineered to favor the strong. They stress small states’ disproportionate access to just practices, given their heightened insecurity in the global system. Furthermore, they argue that insecurity should be a sufficient condition for the fair treatment of weak states, and that such treatment should not require a formal request. The dialogue is well-known for the Melians’ persistent demand for security and equity at the hands of a powerful actor. Throughout their speeches, they highlight the exploitation of smaller states by great powers–an issue that remains relevant in contemporary discussions of state power and subordination. 

Conclusion

Thucydides’ account of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians details an early interaction between two major powers. For this reason, it remains in circulation within contemporary contexts of great power relations, serving as a resource for scholarly analysis of the theory and patterns underlying such interactions. However, Thucydides also outlines concepts of smaller-state security within the war, emphasizing their disadvantaged position within the international hierarchy. Thucydides details the formation and nature of alliances between great powers and small states, illustrating how weak states are perpetually disempowered in state-to-state relations. This analysis leads to a broader understanding of state hierarchy as it exists between those able to wield power and those unable to do so, as well as how alliances can further concretize hierarchical structures. While the blatant disadvantage of smaller states reveals injustice within the hierarchy, Thucydides also highlights the extent to which small Greek states advocated for their needs. His descriptions of hierarchical structures and state advocacy for justice reveal the importance of smaller-state security to the study of global security as a whole. 

Scholars debate the extent to which contemporary theory should draw upon Thucydides’ account of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. I argue that Thucydides’ focus on small-state security offers valuable potential for further research in security studies. While the character of war has undoubtedly evolved since Ancient Greece in 400 B.C.E, the fundamental nature of war remains consistent across time. Human nature in conflict, as well as the hierarchy of states imposed by the human need for survival, also remains the same. In this way, Thucydides’ analysis of power hierarchy and small-state security remains applicable to modern studies. While hierarchies of power are an inevitable aspect of the healthy competition and function of state structures, the responsibility to ensure justice and fair treatment within the hierarchy falls upon great powers. Historically concretized advantages continuously tilt the system in their favor, making it essential for these actors to be especially mindful of exploitative behavior that excludes small powers from genuine participation in the global system. Policymakers should consider Thucydides’ framework of smaller-state security to enforce this and dismantle abusive hierarchies as they have existed and continue to exist. 

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