The Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act: A Path to Ending a 70-Year Deadlock
By: Alan Hunchan Jeong
Although active fighting ended in 1953, the Korean War technically never concluded. The 1950–1953 conflict ended with an Armistice Agreement rather than a formal peace treaty, leaving the United States, South Korea, and North Korea still, in legal terms, at war. Most notably, South Korea requires every male citizen – many of whom can be easily encountered on U.S. college campuses – to serve in the military, highlighting the seriousness and urgency of geopolitical tensions in a divided nation amid the unresolved war. The region has been in a protracted state of limbo due to decades of hostilities and diplomatic setbacks.
To promote a peaceful resolution of the issues on the Korean Peninsula, Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA) has repeatedly introduced the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act since the 117th Congress. Congressman Sherman emphasizes that the ongoing conflict on the Korean Peninsula is not in the best interests of the United States or its citizens with familial ties in North and South Korea, stressing the urgent need for serious diplomatic efforts to establish peace in the region. [1] The measure calls for the promotion of dialogue and a binding peace agreement between the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea, as well as the reassessment of the current stringent restrictions on U.S. interaction with North Korea.
The bill outlines a set of initiatives aimed at promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula. To begin, the bill seeks to restore diplomacy between South Korea, North Korea, and the United States, with the goal of officially ending the Korean War and establishing U.S.-North Korea liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang. [2] The legislation requires the U.S. Department of State to submit a report to Congress outlining “a clear roadmap for achieving permanent peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula;” this report would include diplomatic strategies and recommendations for advancing U.S. engagement with both North Korea and South Korea to reach a “binding peace agreement constituting a formal and final end to the state of war between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States.” [3] By providing a framework for dialogue and permanent peace, the bill seeks to reinvigorate diplomatic efforts for engagement with North Korea that have largely stalled since the breakdown of the 2019 U.S.-North Korea talks in Hanoi, Vietnam. The failed attempt of the U.S.-North Korea Hanoi Summit reinforces the need for a detailed framework on how to approach North Korea. The backdrop for improving relations still exists, however, as the U.S.-North Korea joint statement signed in Singapore in 2018 included an agreement to “establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.” [4] A binding peace agreement and the respective liaison offices would not only enhance U.S.-North Korea relations by facilitating engagement that serves U.S. national interests but also advance greater humanitarian causes.
A second provision of the bill calls for a review of the travel restrictions currently in place for U.S. nationals wishing to visit North Korea. [5] Since 2017, the U.S. government has enforced strict travel bans preventing Americans from visiting North Korea due to security concerns, particularly in light of the tragic case of Otto Warmbier, a U.S. college student who died after being detained by North Korean authorities. [6] While these restrictions were enacted for citizens’ safety, the bill recognizes the “compelling humanitarian considerations” to reunite U.S. citizens with family members left in North Korea, as around 100,000 Americans have relatives there – at least to allow them to attend a funeral, burial, or commemoration of their loved ones. [7]
Despite its grand initiatives, the bill confronts substantial challenges. Opponents argue that the legislation seems premature and could pose serious security risks to South Korea, as it could result in the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed there, the weakening of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the dissolution of the United Nations Command, and the lifting of sanctions on North Korea without ensuring its denuclearization. [8] To address critics’ concerns that the bill’s enactment could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, the updated version of the legislation introduced in the 118th Congress includes Section 6, Rule of Construction: “Nothing in this Act may be construed to affect the status of United States Armed Forces stationed in South Korea or any other foreign country.” [9] Accordingly, Seoul’s stances on engagement with North Korea and a peace agreement are determining factors. While past South Korean administrations – particularly under Presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in – actively pursued engagement with North Korea through several summit meetings with its leaders, the current conservative administration has taken a hawkish stance on North Korea. [10]
However, it is important to recognize that the kind of engagement the bill calls for with North Korea does not necessarily mean appeasement. Instead, it provides opportunities to manage tensions, lower the risk of contingencies, and gradually build trust between opposing parties. A realpolitik example is the rapprochement between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China during the Sino-Soviet split in the Cold War, which may have aided U.S. national interests by hastening the eventual decline of the Soviet Union. Policymakers must carefully navigate the broader geopolitical landscape to discover creative diplomatic pathways that could boost overall security.
As the bill continues to progress through Congress – it already enjoys bipartisan backing, with 52 cosponsors by the end of the 118th Congress – its success will hinge on public support for engagement over confrontation. [11] If the Act becomes law, it will represent a major step toward peace, not only on the Korean Peninsula but across East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. It would be a reminder that careful diplomacy and patient engagement can still work when it comes to addressing long-standing regional challenges, such as the ones on the Korean Peninsula and in other notable places, such as the Taiwan Strait.
NOTES:
1. “Congressman Brad Sherman Leads Colleagues in Re-Introducing the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” Congressman Brad Sherman, March 1, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025, https://sherman.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-brad-sherman-leads-colleagues-in-re-introducing-the-peace-on.
2. “Text - H.R.1369 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” Congress.gov, March 3, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1369/text.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Department of State, “United States Passports Invalid for Travel To, In, or through the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),” Federal Register, August 8, 2024, accessed February 15, 2025, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/08/2024-17519/united-states-passports-invalid-for-travel-to-in-or-through-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea.
7. “Text - H.R.1369.”
8. Hyeon-seok Gang, “[bareondae] ‘hanbando pyeonghwabeobane’un sigisangjo [[Speakers’ Corner] The ‘Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act’ Is Premature],” Koreatimes.com, February 12, 2025, accessed February 15, 2025, http://www.koreatimes.com/article/20250212/1551631.
9. “Text - H.R.1369.”
10. Gagan Hitkari, “Why South Korea Needs to Reassess Its Hardline Stance against Pyongyang,” South China Morning Post, November 10, 2024, accessed February 15, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3285856/why-south-korea-needs-reassess-its-hardline-stance-against-pyongyang.
11. “Cosponsors - H.R.1369 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” Congress.gov, March 3, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1369/cosponsors.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Congress.gov. “Cosponsors - H.R.1369 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” March 3, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1369/cosponsors.
Congress.gov. “Text - H.R.1369 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” March 3, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1369/text.
Congressman Brad Sherman. “Congressman Brad Sherman Leads Colleagues in Re-Introducing the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” March 1, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025. https://sherman.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-brad-sherman-leads-colleagues-in-re-introducing-the-peace-on.
Department of State. “United States Passports Invalid for Travel To, In, or through the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).” Federal Register, August 8, 2024, accessed February 15, 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/08/2024-17519/united-states-passports-invalid-for-travel-to-in-or-through-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea.
Gang, Hyeon-seok. “[bareondae] ‘hanbando pyeonghwabeobane’un sigisangjo [[Speakers’ Corner] The ‘Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act’ Is Premature],” Koreatimes.com, February 12, 2025, accessed February 15, 2025. http://www.koreatimes.com/article/20250212/1551631.