Evaluating the Legality of Unilateral Force in the Capture of Nicolas Maduro
By: Elaine Lu
Edited by: David Liu and Ally Kim
On January 3, 2026, United States forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, during a military operation conducted inside Venezuelan territory. They were taken into custody and brought to New York to face federal charges of narco-terrorism, drug trafficking, and possession of weapons offenses. [1] The operation followed a series of U.S. airstrikes across Venezuela, which the Trump administration announced as actions to protect American national security. In the days that followed, President Trump declared that the U.S. would oversee Venezuela during its period of political transition and control its oil sale and production. [2] The arrest of a sitting foreign head of state through unilateral military force is highly unusual in modern international relations. Thus, the question arises: were the United States’ actions of seizing the incumbent leader of another sovereign state legal?
The operation occurred in the political context of Maduro’s authoritarian rule in Venezuela. Governing since 2013, Maduro secured a third term despite significant evidence of his loss in the disputed 2024 election. During his rule, he was known for consolidating power, repressing opposition leaders, and leading the country toward economic decline. [3] The Trump administration cited the alleged ties between the Maduro government and drug cartels, including the gang Tren de Aragua, as justification for his capture. [4] In his absence, Maduro loyalist Delcy Rodríguez is serving as interim president, despite Trump’s assertions that the U.S. would manage the transition of Venezuela. Opposition leader María Corina Machado is also seeking favor with Trump, who has shown no clear support of either party. [5]
Regardless of the political instability or credible allegations of the criminal conduct of Maduro, experts must examine the legality of the U.S. operation through the lens of international law. According to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, nations should refrain from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” [6] The inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 is an exception to this article, but despite the allegations of the Trump administration regarding transnational criminal activity, these claims do not constitute an “armed attack” as there is no clear and imminent armed threat. Additionally, customary international law dictates that the law grants incumbent heads of state immunity from criminal jurisdiction of foreign domestic courts while in office. [7] Under this doctrine, the U.S. lacks the proper jurisdiction to prosecute Maduro as an incumbent foreign head of state. The unprovoked use of force against Venezuelan sovereign territory and its head of state constitute clear breaches of international legislation.
In response to international backlash, Trump invoked the 1823 Monroe Doctrine as historical justification for U.S. intervention in the Western Hemisphere, arguing that the U.S. has the right to operate within its sphere of influence. The framework of these arguments stems from the perspective of protecting national security, the status of Venezuela as a drug threat, and the desire to influence regime change and democracy. Legal experts, however, such as Federica D’Alessandro of the International Bar Association, state that the reasoning of the administration is contradictory and does not align with the facts of the situation. She argues that the conflict cannot “simultaneously be a law enforcement operation and a non-international armed conflict” and that the conduct of the U.S. needs to abide by “established international standards.” Using force against Maduro escalates the issue into an international armed conflict with Venezuela, and the military action cannot be classified solely as law enforcement against drug cartels. Similarly, the strikes against alleged drug-smuggling ships are not proper execution of law enforcement, and legal scholars could consider them as murder on the high seas. [8]
Domestic constitutional questions further complicate the legality of the operation. In a Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel memorandum, the Trump administration argued that drug trafficking amounted to an armed conflict that justified the use of U.S. forces under the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief. [9] While Article II [10] of the Constitution gives the President control of the armed forces as Commander in Chief, Article I [11] grants Congress the authority to declare war. Since the 1973 War Powers Resolution, the law has expected presidents to obtain congressional approval or at least notify Congress before sustained hostilities. However, Congress did not authorize force against Venezuela prior to the operation and the administration did not inform them, resulting in bipartisan concerns of overreach. On January 8, the Senate voted to pass S.J.Res.98, directing the President to withdraw U.S. forces in Venezuela not authorized by Congress. [12] By equating drug trafficking with armed conflict and invoking war powers, the Trump administration tests the boundaries of presidential powers to deploy military forces without legislative approval.
One can draw a historical comparison to the 1989 capture of Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega in the U.S. invasion of Panama. Indicted in Florida on drug trafficking, forces seized Noriega and transported him to the U.S. to face trial following military intervention in Panama. The defense of Noriega argued that “the precedent of sovereign immunity and his status as a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention barred his execution,” but District Judge Hoeveler ruled against Noriega, stating that acts done by a person “outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce… effects within it” justifies the ability of the State to prosecute the individual. Crucially, the court denied Noriega head-of-state immunity due to his de facto ruling status and the Panamanian Constitution or the United States never recognized his authority. [13] This case does set a precedent for allowing a person to face trial domestically regardless of their circumstances leading to their return to the U.S., but the important difference to recognize is that the international community did not recognize Noriega, unlike Maduro, as the official head-of-state of Panama.
The broader implications of the capture of Maduro extend beyond the relations between the U.S. and Venezuela. The customary head-of-state immunity and prohibition of the use of force on sovereign states are designed to keep legal order and prevent coercion by powerful states. If global superpowers like the U.S., Russia, or China are able to seize foreign leaders based on alleged security concerns and assert their influence on a destabilized nation without a leader, this precedent could erode protections, escalate conflicts, and destabilize diplomatic norms. Regardless of whether the leader has legitimate allegations of criminal conduct, bypassing mechanisms set by international entities like the United Nations risks normalizing dangerous enforcement through force.
Ultimately, the legality of the capture of Nicolás Maduro hinges on whether the administration can reconcile it with established exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force and customary rules concerning head-of-state immunity. Without a clearly outlined self-defense claim responding to an armed attack, the operation appears difficult to justify under prevailing international law. Domestically, the absence of clear congressional authority suggests the operation may constitute an overextension of executive power, especially without a declaration of war. As a result, significant international criticism exists, along with legal debate in forums like the UN Security Council about the possible violation of international law. However, there have been no formal Security Council resolutions or International Court of Justice resolutions condemning the capture of Maduro, indicating a significant test for the modern legal order in terms of constraining world powers and protecting sovereignty.
Notes:
United States District Court, Southern District of New York, “United States of America v. Nicolás Maduro Moros, et al., S4 11 Cr. 205 (AKH), Superseding Indictment,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, January 3, 2026. https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1422326/dl.
Claire Ribando Seelke, “U.S. Capture of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro: Considerations for Congress,”Congress.Gov, January 1, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12618
John Otis, “Maduro and opposition both claim victory in Venezuela’s presidential election,” NPR, July 24, 2029. https://www.npr.org/2024/07/29/nx-s1-5055582/maduro-declared-winner-venezuela-presidential-election
Seelke, “U.S. Capture of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12618
Vanessa Buschschulüter, “Who is running Venezuela and what are Trump’s oil plans?” BBC, February 6, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crmlz7r0zrxo
United Nations, “Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs: Article 2(4), Supplement No. 7, Volume I,” Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs. https://legal.un.org/repertory/art2/english/rep_supp7_vol1_art2_4.pdf.
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “UN Experts Condemn US Aggression against Venezuela,” United Nations, January 7, 2026. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/un-experts-condemn-us-aggression-against-venezuela
William Roberts, “The New Age of Aggression,” International Bar Association, February 2, 2026. https://www.ibanet.org/The-new-age-of-aggression
Office of Legal Counsel, “Memorandum on the Use of Force in Venezuela and the Capture of Nicolás Maduro,” U.S. Department of Justice, December 23, 2025. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/26471613-olc-memo-on-venezuela-maduro-capture/
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Allison Pecorin, “Senate advances war powers resolution to rein in Trump on Venezuela,” ABC News, January 8, 2026.
Scott Bomboy, “Looking Back: The Noriega case as legal precedent,” National Constitution Center, January 8, 2026. https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/looking-back-the-noriega-case-as-legal-precedent
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