Legality of Trump Administration's Intervention in Venezuela
By: Cecilia Jacobsen
Edited by: Haley Kleinman and Hailey Kim
On January 3, 2026, the United States used 150 military aircraft to coordinate airstrikes across Venezuela, where the now former president Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were captured. [1] With no loss on the U.S. side, Venezuela’s interior minister said 100 people died in the attack. [1] Trump announced that Venezuela will provide 30 to 50 million barrels of oil to the U.S., valued at around $2 to $3 billion. [1] His stated intention is to sell the oil on the open market so the proceeds can benefit both American and Venezuelan citizens [1]. Trump defended his action under Article II of the Constitution, claiming that he has the authority to defend the country against the alleged threat of Venezuelan drug cartels harboring offensive weapons and drug trafficking, perceiving them as terrorist organizations. [2] However, many consider this a direct violation of international law, specifically under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which states that a country may not threaten the territorial integrity of any state. [3] [4] Due to this conflict, there are legal questions regarding the intervention, specifically if the Trump administration complied with domestic law, international law, both, or neither. These questions about the intervention and capture of Maduro critically examine the validity of the president’s expansive interpretation of the executive's war and military powers, which may, in turn, raise legitimate constitutional and international law concerns.
Venezuela holds the world’s largest oil reserves, and, post-World War II, the nation had the fourth-highest GDP per capita globally. However, President Hugo Chavez's policies led to hyperinflation, political corruption, and weak governance. [5] Following his leadership, Maduro executed a regime of human rights abuses and authoritarian rule, and consequently, about 8 million Venezuelans left the country due to a lack of basic necessities. Many of these immigrants migrated to the U.S., creating tension with Trump. Narcoterrorism conspiracies of the weaponization of cocaine to damage the U.S. soon followed [5]. Trump has placed direct blame on Maduro, as the engineer behind the mass migration, and the “unpunished thief” of American oil. [6] Furthermore, Trump had accused Maduro of overseeing Cartel de Los Soles, which instead is a figure of speech in Latin America to characterize corrupt military officials, according to former narcotics enforcement officials. [6] These claims have minimal evidentiary basis. Despite these accusations, there was no formal declaration of war by either Venezuela or the United States, and Venezuela has not perpetrated an armed invasion against U.S. territory or military facilities [7].
It is constitutional law that Congress has the authority to declare war under Article I, labeled the War Powers Clause. [8] Nevertheless, Trump asserts his Article II powers in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in defense of the military action against Venezuela, asserting that Maduro’s actions and Venezuela were an imminent threat to U.S. safety. [9] [10] This claim is widely questioned by critics, despite ongoing debate over what constitutes defensive and offensive force. [11] The military action is considered an attack on a sovereign country and the seizure of its leader, with an agenda to exploit the country’s oil. [11] However, the administration defended its actions by citing a long-standing precedent for U.S. use of military force without congressional approval. For example, Congress has formally declared war only a handful of times, which does not reflect the number of times the U.S. has exerted force in foreign countries. [12] Furthermore, the Trump Administration has released a redacted version of an Office of Legal Counsel memorandum stating that the use of force in Venezuela “does not rise to the level of war in a constitutional sense,” thereby nullifying the need for congressional approval. [13] [14]
Additionally, in the broader conversation about precedent and legality, the Bush administration's invasion to capture Manuel Noriega in Panama is relevant. While there are similarities, the invasion of Panama had a genuine basis in self-defense; the critique focused on the disproportionate use of force. [15] Along with a declaration of a state of war with the U.S., Panamanian forces were harassing U.S. servicemembers and citizens, killing a Marine and injuring others. [15] These actions do not exist in the context of the invasion of Venezuela. However, with the Panama Invasion, the “Barr Doctrine” emerged as a justification for Bush’s actions and offered an expansive interpretation of executive power. [16] Previous Assistant Attorney General Bill Barr, who served as U.S. Attorney General during Trump’s first term, essentially concluded that the FBI has the authority to arrest people internationally, without regard to international law. [16] Overall, interpretations of domestic law often conflict with international law, as several interpretations determine the legality and constitutionality of U.S. military force in Venezuela.
Regarding international law, the answer to legality is simpler. The United Nations Charter Article 2(4) explicitly prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. [17] The Trump administration claims that its actions align with the UN Charter under Article 51, which addresses self-defense, and that nothing in the Charter should prevent self-defense in the context of an armed attack, or with Security Council authorization. [17] The allegations of narco-terrorism are not a form of “armed attack,” and there was no prior authorization to attack Venezuela and seize Maduro. By extension, there is a legal tension between what armed action is permitted under the U.S. constitution and the international law requirements for maintaining foreign diplomacy. The question of whether Venezuela was a victim of an unlawful intervention underscores how international law operates differently from a functioning domestic legal system, as most international law is enforced horizontally rather than through centralized enforcement. [18]
Further complications in international law include the fact that the actions of the U.S. are unlawful against the state of Venezuela, but not against Maduro himself. [18] There is a consensus that sitting heads of state are not subject to the jurisdiction of other states’ courts, but in the U.S., Maduro is not recognized as Venezuela’s head of state as of 2019. [18] Therefore, Maduro would likely be unsuccessful in invoking immunity under international law and would fail to mobilize international pressure from other countries. [18] Additionally, an indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) would put foreign allies of the U.S. in a challenging position, prompting the ICC to exercise caution in legal proceedings against Trump to avoid a larger confrontation. [18] While Trump’s actions are blatantly illegal under international law, the law does not function the same way as domestic legal systems do, as there is no police force. It relies on the dynamics of foreign relations. There is a broader concern about the systemic functions of international law, as it relies on leaders' compliance without effective enforcement. As a result, events similar to those that transpired in Venezuela are likely to have no repercussions.
The Trump administration’s actions in Venezuela expose the inconsistency and discord between international and domestic law. The pluralistic nature shifts from harmonious to uncertain when there is an increasing disregard for international law and relations with the goal of achieving more expansive executive power. Generally, Trump lacks a defensible motive, as control of oil is driven by economic incentives rather than genuine concerns for human rights and safety. However, given the broad scope of executive powers, the reasoning becomes increasingly inconsistent with the international code aimed at maintaining peaceful relations. If Trump’s actions and justifications are considered well-founded, it could set a risky precedent that normalizes military interventions driven by transactional and economic incentives. Countries like Venezuela, which are currently left with an ambiguous roadmap for governance, would be at risk of sudden military attacks and government instability. Additionally, international legal systems rely on voluntary respect and compliance, which can directly conflict with domestic policy, and a major power disregarding these norms sets a dangerous precedent in international affairs. The legality of the U.S. military intervention in Venezuela relies on whether one maintains the perspective that it is a limited and justifiable national security enforcement or an undeclared war that pushes constitutional and international boundaries.
Notes:
Miranda Jeyaretnam and Chad de Guzman. “What’s Happening with the U.S. and Venezuela, Explained,” Time, January 12, 2026, https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/.
Nandika Chatterjee, “What Is the Monroe Doctrine, and How Is Trump Reasserting It?” Time, January 7, 2026, https://time.com/7343795/trump-venezuela-monroe-doctrine-history/.
Stanford Legal Podcast - Q&A With Allen Weiner, “Flexing U.S. Power in Venezuela,” Stanford Law School, January 10, 2026, https://law.stanford.edu/2026/01/10/flexing-u-s-power-in-venezuela/.
“United Nations Charter (Full Text),” United Nations, accessed February 17, 2026, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
Miranda Jeyaretnam and Chad de Guzman. “What’s Happening with the U.S. and Venezuela, Explained,” Time, January 12, 2026, https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/.
Linda Qiu, “Fact-Checking Trump’s Justifications for the Venezuela Operation - The New York Times,” The New York Times, January 8, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/us/politics/venezuela-trump-maduro-fact-check.html.
Katherine Yon Ebright, “No Legal Basis for Invading Venezuela,” Brennan Center for Justice, January 6, 2026, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/no-legal-basis-invading-venezuela.
U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8 (Powers of Congress).
U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1 (Commander in Chief Clause).
Miranda Jeyaretnam and Chad de Guzman. “What’s Happening with the U.S. and Venezuela, Explained,” Time, January 12, 2026, https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/.
Michael Waldman, “Attack in Venezuela Was Unconstitutional,” Brennan Center for Justice, January 6, 2026, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/attack-venezuela-was-unconstitutional.
John Yoo, “The Trump Administration’s Actions in Venezuela Are Constitutional,” National Review, January 4, 2026, https://www.nationalreview.com/2026/01/the-trump-administrations-actions-in-venezuela-are-constitutional/.
Katherine Pompilio, “Trump Administration Releases Legal Opinion on Maduro Capture, Attacks on Venezuela,” Lawfare, January 13, 2026, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/trump-administration-releases-legal-opinion-on-maduro-capture--attacks-on-venezuela.
Office of Legal Counsel and T. Elliot Gaiser, “Memorandum Regarding the Use of Force and Capture of Nicolás Maduro.” U.S. Department of Justice § (2025), https://www.justice.gov/olc/media/1423306/dl?inline.
Katherine Yon Ebright, “No Legal Basis for Invading Venezuela,” Brennan Center for Justice, January 6, 2026, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/no-legal-basis-invading-venezuela.
Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, “Imperial Prerogative: How the Panama Invasion and the ‘Barr Doctrine’ Set the Stage for the Maduro ‘Snatch’ Operation,” National Security Archive Briefing Book, January 16, 2026, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/2026-01-16/imperial-prerogative-how-panama-invasion-and-barr-doctrine-set-stage
“United Nations Charter (Full Text),” United Nations, accessed February 18, 2026, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
Stanford Legal Podcast - Q&A With Allen Weiner, “Flexing U.S. Power in Venezuela,” Stanford Law School, January 10, 2026, https://law.stanford.edu/2026/01/10/flexing-u-s-power-in-venezuela/.
Bibliography:
Chatterjee, Nandika. “What Is the Monroe Doctrine, and How Is Trump Reasserting It?” Time, January 7, 2026. https://time.com/7343795/trump-venezuela-monroe-doctrine-history/.
Ebright, Katherine Yon. “No Legal Basis for Invading Venezuela.” Brennan Center for Justice, January 6, 2026. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/no-legal-basis-invading-venezuela.
Jeyaretnam, Miranda, and Chad de Guzman. “What’s Happening with the U.S. and Venezuela, Explained.” Time, January 12, 2026. https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/.
Office of Legal Counsel, and T. Elliot Gaiser. “Memorandum Regarding the Use of Force and Capture of Nicolás Maduro.” U.S. Department of Justice § (2025). https://www.justice.gov/olc/media/1423306/dl?inline.
Pompilio, Katherine. “Trump Administration Releases Legal Opinion on Maduro Capture, Attacks on Venezuela.” Lawfare, January 13, 2026. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/trump-administration-releases-legal-opinion-on-maduro-capture--attacks-on-venezuela.
Qiu, Linda. “Fact-Checking Trump’s Justifications for the Venezuela Operation - The New York Times.” The New York Times, January 8, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/us/politics/venezuela-trump-maduro-fact-check.html
Stanford Legal Podcast - Q&A With Allen Weiner, “Flexing U.S. Power in Venezuela.” Stanford Law School, January 10, 2026. https://law.stanford.edu/2026/01/10/flexing-u-s-power-in-venezuela/.
“United Nations Charter (Full Text).” United Nations. Accessed February 18, 2026. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
Waldman, Michael. “Attack in Venezuela Was Unconstitutional .” Brennan Center for Justice, January 6, 2026. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/attack-venezuela-was-unconstitutional.
Yoo, John. “The Trump Administration’s Actions in Venezuela Are Constitutional.” National Review, January 4, 2026. https://www.nationalreview.com/2026/01/the-trump-administrations-actions-in-venezuela-are-constitutional/.