The Chevron Deference and the Future of Regulatory Agencies in the United States

By: Eliana Aemro Selassie

Edited by: Eleanor Bergstein and Madison bruno

The Chevron Deference is an important precedent in administrative law that could soon be overturned, changing the legal jurisdiction of both federal agencies and Congress. Chevron became an important legal precedent as a result of the Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. case heard by the Supreme Court in 1984. [1] The Chevron case arose when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revised the Clean Air Act, allowing states to group pollution-emitting devices under the same “bubble” or regulatory term. This greatly benefitted major fossil fuel corporations like Chevron since the bubble regulation included provisions allowing industrial and fossil fuel plants to install new pieces of equipment without new permits that the act previously required. Several environmental groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council challenged the regulation, viewing it as a violation of the Clean Air Act and an attempt by the federal government to loosen air pollution restrictions. The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of the EPA’s interpretation of the Clear Air Act and its applications, establishing the Chevron deference. [2]

Despite marking an initial loss for environmental groups, the Chevron case has had a fundamental impact on administrative law. The Chevron case was particularly impactful because it set a new precedent for the jurisdiction of government agencies, extending their power to determine interpretations of Congressional statutes if the statute is ambiguous. [3] Under the Chevron deference, federal courts can accept a federal agency’s interpretation of “an ambiguous or unclear statute” entrusted to the agency by Congress. Despite the important role that Chevron has played in administrative law, there is a large possibility that it could be overturned. Under the Trump Administration, a growing number of Supreme Court justices have shifted to critique the Chevron deference, questioning its validity. [4] At the forefront of this shift is Justice Clarence Thomas, who was previously one of the biggest proponents of Chevron. In 2005, Thomas wrote an opinion defending Chevron in the National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services case. In the opinion, Thomas argued that “Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation”. [3]

Thomas’ defense of Chevron and its applications in administrative law has gradually weakened over time. In the Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency of 2015, Thomas sided with fellow conservative justices, arguing that the EPA had exceeded its jurisdiction, arguing against the extended power that Chevron grants to government agencies. Justice Thomas eventually publicly announced that his opinion in 2005 on the Brand X case was ill-advised, formally shifting his stance to become an opponent of Chevron. Many have pointed out that Thomas’ shift to critiquing Chevron was largely a result of gifts he received from conservative businessmen. Billionaires Harlan Crow and Leonard Leo are among many businessmen who have worked to overturn Chevron to benefit from looser government agency regulations that removing Chevron would provide. Both Crow and Leo have actively provided Thomas and his family with substantial gifts like luxury travel and financial donations. In addition to Justice Thomas, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh have also publicly expressed their opposition to Chevron, illustrating a growing opposition to Chevron's deference in the Supreme Court that could potentially lead to it being overturned [3]. 

The Chevron deference is now under threat of being overturned in the upcoming Supreme Court case Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The case determines whether the federal agency National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) can place limits on fish catch to prevent overfishing by major fishing companies like Loper Bright Enterprises. [5] The outcome of the case will effectively determine if the Supreme Court should overrule Chevron. [6] Overturning Chevron could have potentially disastrous consequences for administrative law and the future of government agencies. If Chevron were overturned, federal judges would be increasingly responsible for interpreting statutes that agents specialized in addressing the issues are much better suited to do. [5] Government agencies are responsible for a myriad of health, environmental, safety, and financial issues. Officials in these agencies should be allowed to use their expertise to address matters in those fields, rather than federal judges. Furthermore, as the climate crisis worsens, limiting the jurisdiction of environmental agencies like the EPA could reduce their capacity to address environmental issues. The ever-worsening state of the environment could continue to decline as a result of the limitations placed on environmental agencies, potentially restricting their already limited control over environmental policy. Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision could immensely impact how regulatory agencies operate and the future of administrative law in the United States. [7]

Notes:

  1. Cornell University. “Chevron deference Primary tabs.” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chevron_deference.

  2. Stevens, John Paul. “Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.” Oyez, 29 February 1984, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1005. Accessed 2 March 2024.

  3. Rock, Julia, and Andrew Perez. “Influenced by Dark Money, Clarence Thomas Has Reversed His Position on a Landmark Legal Doctrine.” Jacobin, 10 May 2023, https://jacobin.com/2023/05/clarence-thomas-chevron-regulatory-doctrine-conservatives-dark-money. Accessed 2 March 2024.

  4. Hamilton, Alexander, and Kenneth Starr. “Chevron deference (doctrine).” Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Chevron_deference_(doctrine). Accessed 2 March 2024.

  5. Pazzanese, Christina. “Scholar explains implications of SCOTUS revisiting 'Chevron deference'— Harvard Gazette.” Harvard Gazette, 16 January 2024, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2024/01/chevron-deference-faces-existential-test/. Accessed 2 March 2024.

  6. Oyez. “Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.” Oyez, 17 January 2024, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2023/22-451. Accessed 2 March 2024.

  7. Turrentine, Jeff. “What Happens If the Supreme Court Ends “Chevron Deference”?” NRDC, 21 June 2023, https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-happens-if-supreme-court-ends-chevron-deference. Accessed 2 March 2024.

Bibliography:

Cornell University. “Chevron deference Primary tabs.” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chevron_deference.

Hamilton, Alexander, and Kenneth Starr. “Chevron deference (doctrine).” Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Chevron_deference_(doctrine). Accessed 2 March 2024.

Oyez. “Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.” Oyez, 17 January 2024, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2023/22-451. Accessed 2 March 2024.

Pazzanese, Christina. “Scholar explains implications of SCOTUS revisiting 'Chevron deference'— Harvard Gazette.” Harvard Gazette, 16 January 2024, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2024/01/chevron-deference-faces-existential-test/. Accessed 2 March 2024.

Rock, Julia, and Andrew Perez. “Influenced by Dark Money, Clarence Thomas Has Reversed His Position on a Landmark Legal Doctrine.” Jacobin, 10 May 2023, https://jacobin.com/2023/05/clarence-thomas-chevron-regulatory-doctrine-conservatives-dark-money. Accessed 2 March 2024.

Stevens, John Paul. “Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.” Oyez, 29 February 1984, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1005. Accessed 2 March 2024.

Turrentine, Jeff. “What Happens If the Supreme Court Ends “Chevron Deference”?” NRDC, 21 June 2023, https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-happens-if-supreme-court-ends-chevron-deference. Accessed 2 March 2024.