THE FORUM: NORTHWESTERN’S PREMIER LEGAL BLOG

Daniel Rodriguez Daniel Rodriguez

The Legality of Sanctuary Cities

Mia Xia

By: Mia Xia

Edited By: Iris Lin and Tess Ballis

         Undocumented immigrants in America have long faced the fear of displacement. The United States has responded to citizen-hopefuls with deliberate exclusionary rhetoric, showing an unwillingness to support those seeking refuge in a country meant to harbor ideals of equality and acceptance. However, various cities, counties, and states across America have opted to declare themselves “sanctuary cities” in response to the federal-level policies. As sanctuary cities, these locations seek to limit encounters with federal-level immigration agencies, protecting low-priority undocumented immigrants while still cooperating to turn in serious crime offenders.[1] For example, if ICE agents were to enter a city with the intent to search for undocumented immigrants, local municipalities would not have an obligation to comply with or actively aid in federal processes. Rather, they can deny or disallow the agency from pursuing actions like jailing or detaining undocumented immigrants and requiring local officials to join in searching for undocumented immigrants. Many states have chosen to legally challenge the notion of sanctuary cities under pretenses of unconstitutionality. Nevertheless, Miami federal judge Beth Bloom’s blocking of Florida’s sanctuary city ban this September reflects the wider belief in a city’s right to protect undocumented immigrants.[2] This paper analyzes the legality of sanctuary cities under federal law, and how states can ultimately work within the legal confines to admit themselves as a sanctuary city.

         In reality, the term ‘sanctuary city’ holds no legal weight, and the federal government has not officially recognized it as such.[3] Cities and states are not allowed to pass legislation that can limit cooperation with federal agencies, as it would be against federal law to do so.[4] This legal constraint appears in US Code Chapter 8, Section 1373: federal law prevents state or local governments from passing policy to prohibit federal agencies from sharing the legal status of an immigrant.[5] Even so, Section 1373 does not necessarily require state and local law to disclose collected information concerning an immigrant’s status and even allows for denial to comply with federal immigration agencies.[6]

         Following the supremacy clause of the Tenth Amendment, federal law becomes the supreme law of the land which would allow for this declaration to persist over state jurisdiction. However, under the Tenth Amendment, federal governments are not permitted to “issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”[7] In Arizona et al v. the United States, the Supreme Court has abided by this interpretation, delegating the duty of immigration enforcement to the federal government, with state and local law enforcement only obligated to carry out enforcement if authorized by federal orders.[8]

         Even though sanctuary cities are technically legal, challenges have still arisen. They began in 2012 with the Obama administration contesting Cook County, Illinois’ refusal to cooperate with ICE. These challenges have only continued, as during the early stages of Trump’s presidency, the president began to question the legality of sanctuary cities using executive actions and judicial decisions.[9] Most notoriously, Executive Order 13767 of January 2017 imposed federal law to require state cooperation in the detaining and deportation of undocumented immigrants with threats of cutting federal funding.[10] However, as Section 1373 is the only real federal mandate that can be applied to state and local municipalities, many states and cities took proactive measures to refuse to abide by this executive order. Evanston officials answered by reaffirming their status as a sanctuary city, and even denouncing the denial of federal funds as unconstitutional.[11] California answered by passing their own policy, SB 54, or the California Values Act/the “sanctuary” law, which prevents jail officials from informing ICE when an undocumented immigrant prisoner is released unless warrants are presented.[12] As ICE would violate the Fourth Amendment when imposing unreasonable search and seizure without warrants, California ensured that they remained within the bounds of constitutionality and even used the wording of the Fourth Amendment to further guarantee the protection of undocumented immigrants from federal agencies.[13]

         Even after constant legal challenges and threats of cutting federal funding, sanctuary jurisdiction still remains strong in the protection of undocumented immigrants. As of now, seven states have declared themselves sanctuary cities, and 24 states hold counties that also define themselves as such.[14] Contrary to Trump’s rhetoric of sanctuary cities as “hotbeds for crime,” these regions find lower rates of all crimes compared to non-sanctuary counties.[15] This is because a mutual level of trust and accountability between undocumented immigrants and state/local agencies occurs when both parties acknowledge the stakes at hand. If an undocumented immigrant commits a serious crime, there poses a serious risk to their ability to remain in America and likewise, if cities seek to comply with federal immigration officials, undocumented immigrants are less likely to report crime and assist investigations in fear of deportation.[16] In the end, an easier path to citizenship is key to allowing every person to find refuge and pursue economic opportunities in America. For now, however, sanctuary cities are the best answer in protecting a population that the federal government unjustly targets.

Notes:

  1. Dara Lind, Sanctuary Cities, Explained, (Vox, 8 March 2018). https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/8/17091984/sanctuary-cities-city-state-illegal-immigration-sessions.

  2. Ana Ceballos, Miami federal judge blocks Florida from enforcing ban on ‘sanctuary cities,’ (Miami Herald, 21 September 2021) https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article254422638.html

  3. Lind, Sanctuary Cities, Explained. 

  4. 8 U.S. Code § 1373 - Communication between Government Agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, (LII / Legal Information Institute) www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1373.

  5. Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, (American Immigration Council, 21 October 2020). https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/sanctuary-policies-overview.

  6. Sanctuary Policies: An Overview.

  7. Arizona et al. v. United States, (US Supreme Court, October 2011), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-182b5e1.pdf.

  8. Grace Benton, The Legality of Sanctuary Cities, (Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 2019), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/immigration-law-journal/in-print/the-legality-of-sanctuary-cities/.

  9. Executive Order 13767, (Federal Register, 25 January 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-02095/border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements.

  10. Mariana Alfaro, Evanston Chicago vow to uphold immigration policies amid U.S. Justice Department threats, (The Daily Northwestern, 29 March 2017), https://dailynorthwestern.com/2017/03/29/city/evanston-chicago-vow-to-uphold-immigration-policies-amid-u-s-justice-department-threats/.

  11. Lind, Sanctuary Cities, Explained. 

  12. The Current State of Sanctuary Law, (Southern Poverty Law Center, 8 March 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/20180308/current-state-sanctuary-law.

  13. Sanctuary Cities, (Aspan Law Offices), http://www.apsanlaw.com/law-246.list-of-sanctuary-cities.html.

  14. Christopher Ingrahm, Trump says sanctuary cities are hotbeds of crime. Data say the opposite, (The Washington Post, 27 January 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/27/trump-says-sanctuary-cities-are-hotbeds-of-crime-data-say-the-opposite/.

  15. Ingrahm, Trump says sanctuary cities are hotbeds of crime. Data say the opposite. 

  16. Ibid.

Bibliography:

“8 U.S. Code § 1373 - Communication between Government Agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.” LII / Legal Information Institute, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1373. Accessed 6 Nov. 2021.

Alfaro, Mariana. “Evanston Chicago vow to uphold immigration policies amid U.S. Justice Department threats.” The Daily Northwestern, 29 March 2017. https://dailynorthwestern.com/2017/03/29/city/evanston-chicago-vow-to-uphold-immigration-policies-amid-u-s-justice-department-threats/

“Arizona et al. v. United States,” US Supreme Court, October 2011. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-182b5e1.pdf

Benton, Grace. “The Legality of Sanctuary Cities,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 2019. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/immigration-law-journal/in-print/the-legality-of-sanctuary-cities/

Ceballos, Ana. “Miami federal judge blocks Florida from enforcing ban on ‘sanctuary cities.’” Miami Herald, 21 September 2021. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article254422638.html

“Executive Order 13767.” Federal Register, 25 January 2017.  https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-02095/border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements

Ingraham, Christopher. “Trump says sanctuary cities are hotbeds of crime. Data say the opposite.” The Washington Post, 27 January 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/27/trump-says-sanctuary-cities-are-hotbeds-of-crime-data-say-the-opposite/

Lind, Dara. “Sanctuary Cities, Explained.” Vox, 8 March 2018. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/8/17091984/sanctuary-cities-city-state-illegal-immigration-sessions

“Sanctuary Cities.” Aspan Law Offices. http://www.apsanlaw.com/law-246.list-of-sanctuary-cities.html

“Sanctuary Policies: An Overview.” American Immigration Council, 21 October 2020. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/sanctuary-policies-overview

“The Current State of Sanctuary Law.” Southern Poverty Law Center, 8 March 2018. https://www.splcenter.org/20180308/current-state-sanctuary-law

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Daniel Rodriguez Daniel Rodriguez

The Information Space Race

Ian Park

By: Ian Park

Edited By: Luke Vredenburg and Tess Ballis

In a November 1 press release, Amazon announced that the company was making progress on its Kuiper Project, an ambitious, decade-long plan that would release 3,236 telecommunications satellites in hopes of providing fast and affordable broadband coverage to underserved parts of the world.[1] Yet, in order to launch the satellites, Amazon had to file an experimental license application with the Federal Communications Commission. Despite satellites of all kinds being in orbit for decades now, uncertainty surrounding private enterprises' use of space has grown. This uncertainty has led to legal debate surrounding the considerations involved in launching commercial telecommunications satellites and the future of the industry as a whole.

From the moment the U.S.S.R. successfully launched Sputnik 1, the first satellite in orbit, in 1957, the world has been working to solidify an understanding of each nation’s rights in outer space. To truly understand space law, we first have to go back to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the first international treaty of its kind concerning the activities of different sovereign nations in the exploration and use of outer space.[2] Since then, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the Registration Convention have all elaborated on the Outer Space Treaty, while the United Nations General Assembly has detailed five declarations and legal principles that further complement these treaties. Among these principles and declarations is the 1982 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting.[3] This UN principle dictates that “activities should promote the free dissemination and mutual exchange of information and knowledge in cultural and scientific fields, assist in educational, social and economic development, particularly in the developing countries.” 

Under the broad umbrella of space law is international satellite law, which governs the usage and oversight of satellites. However, navigating the maze of which laws to comply with gets even more complicated when we consider that the launching and use of satellites by sovereign nations or private corporations fall under two separate standards — the first is the universally agreed-upon international law, and the second is the more specific telecommunications law of each nation. For the purposes of companies such as Amazon and Starlink launching satellites in the United States, we will focus on the laws America has in place regulating commercial space activities. 

Beginning with the Communications Act of 1934, the federal government has laid the groundwork for telephone, telegraph, and radio communications.[4] Since its ratification, the Act has been occasionally amended to add provisions governing satellite television and other media forms. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 was one of the first attempts by the Kennedy administration to address the growing private and commercial interest in space.[5] Many view the Act as unpolished and incomplete but necessary in setting the groundwork for future telecommunications law. The Act established the Communications Satellite Corporation, which would later become the first global telecommunications company in the world. The first major overhaul of telecommunications law, however, came with the Telecommunications Act of 1996.[6] The Act’s purpose was to encourage fair competition and to remove barriers preventing entry into the communications business. As such, an entire section of the Act specifies actions to ensure pro-competitive privatization.[6] Furthermore, Section 303 of the Act stipulated that the Federal Communications Committee would have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the provision of direct-to-home satellite services, including broadband.[6]

More recently, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 (CSLCA) was passed to encourage competition between various private aerospace companies.[7] While CSLCA specifically targets commercial spaceflight instead of satellite launches, the act solidifies America’s commitment toward innovation and fair competition in the growing commercial space race. However, legal scholars have raised concerns about CSLCA’s potential conflict with Article II of the aforementioned UN Outer Space Treaty on the exploitation and use of space resources.[8] They argue that the CSLCA violates a conservative interpretation of Article II that allows for the free use of space, prohibiting the appropriation of space by use or occupation by any one entity.  

But how do the complicated intersections of space, satellite, and telecommunications law affect the way American companies approach commercial satellites and space activity today? As mentioned earlier, companies looking to launch satellites have to adhere to both international andAmerican laws on telecommunications. Amazon, for instance, is launching Project Kuiper partly as a way to explore the infant commercial space industry and to have the operational knowledge necessary to establish future operations.[9] Elon Musk’s Starlink has already secured more than $885 million in grant funding from the FCC and launched 1,740 satellites to date, offering affordable Internet rates in 14 countries.[10] Many believe that thanks to CSLCA and the Telecommunications Act, increased competition in broadband services is going to drive down prices for consumers while expanding coverage. As the larger debate over property rights and commercial entities in space continues to grow, space law is naturally going to be the basis for settling disputes. 

Ultimately, the future of our connected world (and in this case, what lies just outside of it) depends on the telecommunication laws in place at different levels of legislature. While we may take satellites and the critical information transfers they facilitate for granted, their prevalence and necessity in our highly interconnected 21st-century lives are hard to overlook. In their current state, America’s telecommunications laws are pushing the country and, in turn, the world in the right direction to encourage innovation and improve access to a basic human right.

Notes:

  1. Amazon Staff, “Project Kuiper Announces Plans…,” Amazon. 

  2. Stephen Garber, “Outer Space Treaty of 1967,” NASA, https://history.nasa.gov/1967treaty.html. 

  3. UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, “United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs,” UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/principles/dbs-principles.html.  

  4. Bureau of Justice Assistance, “The Communications Act of 1934,” Bureau of Justice Assistance, https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1288. 

  5. Legal Information Institute, “U.S. Code: Title 47. Telecommunications,” Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47.

  6. “76 Stat,” USCODE.HOUSE.GOV, http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/87/624.pdf. 

  7. “U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act - Congress,” Congress, https://congress.gov/114/plaws/publ90/PLAW-114publ90.pdf. 

  8. P.J. Blount and Christian Robinson, “One Small Step: the Impact of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 on the Exploration of Resources in Outer Space,” UNC School of Law, https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1324&context=ncjolt. 

  9. Adam Clark Estes, “The Complicated Promise of Amazon’s Space Internet,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/recode/2021/11/3/22761345/project-kuiper-satellite-amazon-space-internet. 

  10. Ry Crist, “Starlink Explained: Everything You Should Know about Elon Musk’s Satellite Internet Venture,” https://www.cnet.com/home/internet/starlink-satellite-internet-explained/. 

Bibliography:

Amazon Staff. “Project Kuiper Announces Plans and Launch Provider for Prototype Satellites.” About Amazon. Amazon, November 1, 2021. https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/innovation-at-amazon/project-kuiper-announces-plans-and-launch-provider-for-prototype-satellites?asc_campaign=commerce-pra&asc_refurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.businessinsider.com%2Famazon-project-kuiper-launch-spacex-starlink-competitor-satellite-internet-broadband-2021-11%3Futm_source%3Dfeedburner%26utm_medium%3Dfeed%26utm_campaign%3DFeed%253A%2Btypepad%252Falleyinsider%252Fsilicon_alley_insider%2B%2528Silicon%2BAlley%2BInsider%2529&asc_source=browser&tag=thebusiinsi-20&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Recode+11.02.2021&utm_term=Recode. 

Blount, P.J., and Christian Robinson. “UNC Scholarship - University of North Carolina School of ...” One Small Step: the Impact of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 on the Exploration of Resources in Outer Space. UNC School of Law, December 1, 2016. https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1324&context=ncjolt. 

Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Communications Act of 1934. Bureau of Justice Assistance. https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1288. 

Crist, Ry. “Starlink Explained: Everything You Should Know about Elon Musk's Satellite Internet Venture.” CNET, 2021. https://www.cnet.com/home/internet/starlink-satellite-internet-explained/. 

Estes, Adam Clark. “The Complicated Promise of Amazon's Space Internet.” Vox. Vox, November 3, 2021. https://www.vox.com/recode/2021/11/3/22761345/project-kuiper-satellite-amazon-space-internet.

Garber, Stephen. “Outer Space Treaty of 1967.” NASA. NASA, October 26, 2006. https://history.nasa.gov/1967treaty.html. 

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. “United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs.” DBS Principles. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. Accessed https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/principles/dbs-principles.html.  

“U.S. Code: Title 47. Telecommunications.” Legal Information Institute. Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47. 

“U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act - Congress.” U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH COMPETITIVENESS ACT. https://congress.gov/114/plaws/publ90/PLAW-114publ90.pdf. 

“76 Stat.” Public Law 87-624-AUG. 31, 1961. USCODE.HOUSE.GOV. http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/87/624.pdf.

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Daniel Rodriguez Daniel Rodriguez

Confidence in the Judiciary: What to Expect from France's Newly Proposed Bill

Chioma Menankiti

By: Chioma Menankiti

Edited By: Claire Lu and Tess Ballis

At a time when state survival depends heavily on confidence in institutions,[1] the French Minister of Justice, Eric Dupond-Moretti, has proposed a bill that reforms several aspects of French judiciary practice so as to increase public confidence in the country’s judiciary. The bill, termed ‘Bill for Confidence in the Judiciary,’ was presented to the French parliament in April this year by the Minister who claimed to have been inspired by a study conducted by SciencesPo Cevipof on public confidence in French Institutions.[2] The study showed that over 50% of the French public do not have confidence in the French justice system.[3] Participants expressed that their lack of confidence was founded on inadequate resources for judges to perform their responsibilities, a lack of independence of judges from political influences, and a bad-functioning judiciary system in the country.[4] In a bid to address this issue, Mr. Dupond-Moretti proposes some reforms to strengthen judicial guarantees, improve trial and sentence execution provisions and increase confidence in legal professionals.[5] Some of the pertinent provisions of this bill are discussed in this article. 

The first article of the bill provides for trials to be filmed and publicized, a practice which, except in some specific cases, is currently prohibited.[6] By allowing for this new possibility, the Minister aims to improve the knowledge the public has of the functioning of the country’s judiciary. The bill provides for the protection of minors, the authorization of parties, the right of retraction and the publication only after a verdict is reached. France, however, is not the first country to adopt televised proceedings as part of its judicial practice. In the US, popular cases like the O.J. Simpson trials were televised, and countries such as the United Kingdom[7] and Australia[8] have authorized video recordings of court proceedings on some occasions. Filmed proceedings can be advantageous  for educating the public on the judicial process and for inciting judges to be more impartial due to the public pressure on them. Moreover, as judges in France do not publish information on their verdicts,[9] televised proceedings could be revolutionary in educating law students. Despite these clear benefits, televised proceedings have been strongly criticized for inciting public hostility towards defendants[10] and for shifting focus from the pursuit of justice to the pursuit of fame.[11] Therefore, it is possible that this provision which seeks to improve public confidence in the judiciary may result in just the opposite. 

The second article shortens preliminary investigations to two years, allowing for an increase by a year for matters of delinquency, organized crime and terrorism due to their relative complexity.[12] The bill expresses that this article is driven by respect for the rights of victims and suspects as the former, for example, could suffer emotionally while awaiting justice for the wrongs committed against them. Although people often complain about the tardiness of preliminary investigations,[13] a research conducted by the Mattei Commission found that in 2020, over 70% of investigative procedures were concluded within six months of their initiation and almost 93% of all procedures last less than two years.[14] This suggests that the second article of the bill would only bring minor modifications to the current system in the conduct of preliminary investigations. It thus appears that the importance of this article lies in its reassurance to the public that justice will not be delayed. Moreover, the provision is important as it commits France to the goal of the ECHR that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time.[15]

The third article of interest, Article 9, seeks to improve the current provision relating to the execution of sentences.[16] The article will terminate the application of the current penalty reduction system, which awards convicts automatic sentence reduction credits, and impose a new system scheduled to take effect on January 1st, 2023. The current penalty reduction system has been in use since 2004 but was criticized by the supporters of the proposed bill for being incomprehensible to citizens.[17] The bill proposes a new system where the judge can grant a sentence reduction to a convict who has shown sufficient proof of good or rehabilitative behavior. This radical change to the current system has faced condemnation for its “risk of lengthening short sentences and complicating reintegration”,[18] thus contradicting article 14 of the proposed bill whose purpose is to facilitate the reintegration of convicts into society by improving their social and labour rights.

In a similar light, article 11 of the bill establishes a prison employment contract system where convicts would be connected with a company, service or association responsible for the activities carried out by the convicts.[19] If passed, this provision will replace the current prison labor system, where prisoners, if they wish, can sign an act of engagement with the prison administration and complete tasks with different departments within the prison premises for a minimum wage of €1.62 ($1.97).[20] While this new system may award prisoners useful skills and work experience to aid their reinsertion into the society, evidence from the U.S. has shown that using cheap prison labor for work with private companies has produced some negative consequences. In the U.S., this system provides incentives for private companies employing cheap prison labor to lobby for policies that increase incarceration rates so as to maximize their profits.[21] With this outcome, there is a possibility that the practice, which in American correctional facilities has been termed “modern-day slavery,”[22] will produce similar results in France. Nonetheless, a lot remains unclear concerning this provision, such as the detainees’ remuneration and whether the employment will be compulsory or optional. This information is crucial in assessing the full impact this new system could have on public confidence in the French judiciary.

Although the bill for the Confidence of the judiciary addresses several aspects of the French judiciary, it fails to address more pressing issues like the link between the public prosecutor and the Minister of Justice. In France, public prosecutors are under the authority of and therefore accountable to the Minister of Justice. This close relationship between the judiciary and executive increases the risk of judiciary actions being influenced by the executive, especially in high profile cases involving politicians.[23] This conflict of interest is reflected in the prosecutor’s responsibilities, which include both supervising police investigations and representing the public during prosecutions- a judiciary function, and developing and implementing criminal justice policies- an executive function.[24] This arrangement even led the European Court of Human Rights to decide in Moulin v France n° 37104/06, that the public prosecutor was too attached to the executive to oversee Habeas Corpus rights in France.[25] Thus, in order to increase public confidence in the judiciary, this link must be eliminated. 

Once can be positive that the proposed bill will bring about important revolutionary changes to several aspects of the French judiciary that would potentially result in a more efficient, trustworthy judicial system in the country. The provisions of the bill target key areas of judicial practice that inform the public and contribute to legal education, improve prisoners’ employability, and ensure that justice is rendered timely amongst others. These are all characteristics of a good-functioning judiciary system and put France on the right track towards addressing the worries the public expressed with the current judicial system (see Paragraph 1). With the bill past its first hearing, eyes are on the Minister of Justice to see whether his bill, if passed, will indeed increase public confidence in the French judiciary.

Notes:

  1. Miguel João, José Ramos, Sara Domingos, and Rui Cardoso. “The Independence Of The Judiciary In The Democratic Balance Of The 21st Century,” 2018.

  2. Delphine Gotchaux et Mathilde Lemaire. “Réforme de la justice : trois questions sur le projet de loi présenté par Éric Dupond-Moretti en conseil des ministres,” Franceinfo, April 14, 2021. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/justice/reforme-de-la-justice-trois-questions-sur-projet-de-loi-presente-par-eric-dupond-moretti-en-conseil-des-ministres_4370919.html

  3. Claire Gatinois, and Jean-Baptiste Jacquin. “Eric Dupond-Moretti : « Les procès en laxisme sont intentés par les populistes extrémistes ».” Le Monde, April 14, 2021. https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2021/04/14/eric-dupond-moretti-les-proces-en-laxisme-sont-intentes-par-les-populistes-extremistes_6076695_3224.html.

  4. Sciences Po Cevipof. “En Quoi les Français ont-ils Confiance Aujourd’hui?- Vague 12”  Opinion Way, February, 2021 https://www.opinion-way.com/fr/sondage-d-opinion/sondages-publies/opinionway-pour-le-cevipof-barometre-de-la-confiance-en-politique-vague-12-fevrier-2021/viewdocument/2516.html

  5. "45% des Français n’ont pas confiance en la justice.” Atlantico. March 28, 2017, https://atlantico.fr/article/pepite/45-des-francais-n-ont-pas-confiance-en-la-justice.

  6. Assemblée Nationale. “Projet de loi no 4091 pour la confiance dans l’institution judiciaire.” https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/textes/l15b4091_projet-loi.

  7. Gov.uk. “Cameras to Broadcast from the Crown Court for First Time.” 16 January, 2020 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cameras-to-broadcast-from-the-crown-court-for-first-time.

  8. High Court of Australia. “Audio-Visual Recordings of Full Court Hearings in Canberra,” https://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/recent-av-recordings.

  9. “How to Do French Legal Research | Law Library of Congress.” May 3, 2012. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-research-guide/france.php

  10. “Arguments For and Against Allowing Television Cameras into the courtroom,” https://www.unl.edu/eskridge/cj211cameras.html

  11. Georgia Harley. “How Long Is Too Long? When Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied.” World Bank Blogs, March 25 2015.  https://blogs.worldbank.org/europeandcentralasia/how-long-too-long-when-justice-delayed-justice-denied

  12. Assemblée Nationale. “Projet de loi no 4091 pour la confiance dans l’institution judiciaire.” https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/textes/l15b4091_projet-loi.

  13. Adelaide Jacquin, and Emmanuel Daoud. “Projet de loi pour la confiance dans la justice: aspects de procédure pénale”, Dalloz Actualité, 28 April, 2021. https://www.dalloz-actualite.fr/flash/projet-de-loi-pour-confiance-dans-justice-aspects-de-procedure-penale.

  14. Commission Relative aux Droits de la Défense dans l’Enquête Pénale et au Secret Professionnel de l’Avocat. “Le Renforcement de l’Équilibre des Enquêtes Préliminaires et du Secret Professionnel de l’Avocat” https://www.dalloz-actualite.fr/sites/dalloz-actualite.fr/files/resources/2021/02/rapport_-_commission_mattei.pdf.

  15. Georgia Harley. “How Long Is Too Long? When Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied.” World Bank Blogs, March 25 2015.  https://blogs.worldbank.org/europeandcentralasia/how-long-too-long-when-justice-delayed-justice-denied

  16. Assemblée Nationale. “Projet de loi no 4091 pour la confiance dans l’institution judiciaire.” https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/textes/l15b4091_projet-loi.

  17. Ibid. 

  18. Adelaide Jacquin, and Emmanuel Daoud. “Projet de loi pour la confiance dans la justice: aspects de procédure pénale”, Dalloz Actualité, 28 April, 2021. https://www.dalloz-actualite.fr/flash/projet-de-loi-pour-confiance-dans-justice-aspects-de-procedure-penale.

  19. Assemblée Nationale. “Projet de loi no 4091 pour la confiance dans l’institution judiciaire.” https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/textes/l15b4091_projet-loi.

  20. “Travail en prison.” October, 2021 https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F14153

  21. Cindy Wu, and Prue Brady. “Private Companies Producing with US Prison Labor in 2020: Prison Labor in the US, Part II”, Corporate Accountability Lab, August 5, 2020. https://corpaccountabilitylab.org/calblog/2020/8/5/private-companies-producing-with-us-prison-labor-in-2020-prison-labor-in-the-us-part-ii.

  22. Alexia Fernández Campbell. “The Federal Government Markets Prison Labor to Businesses as the ‘Best-Kept Secret.’” Vox, August 24, 2018. https://www.vox.com/2018/8/24/17768438/national-prison-strike-factory-labor.

  23. Jacqueline Hodgson, and Laurène Soubise. “Prosecution in France” Oxford University Press, 2017. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2980309.

  24. Ibid.

  25. Nicole Atwill. “European Court of Human Rights; France: Applicant’s Police Custody Rights Violated as Public Prosecutor Not Competent Legal Authority Under Article 5 § 3” Law Library of Congress. December 13, 2010. //www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/european-court-of-human-rights-france-applicants-police-custody-rights-violated-as-public-prosecutor-not-competent-legal-authority-under-article-5-3/

Bibliography:

“Arguments For and Against Allowing Television Cameras into the courtroom,” https://www.unl.edu/eskridge/cj211cameras.htl


“How to Do French Legal Research | Law Library of Congress.” May 3, 2012. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-research-guide/france.php

“Travail en prison.” October, 2021 https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F14153

Adelaide, Jacquin and Emmanuel  Daoud. “Projet de loi pour la confiance dans la justice : aspects de procédure pénale”, Dalloz Actualité, 28 April, 2021. https://www.dalloz-actualite.fr/flash/projet-de-loi-pour-confiance-dans-justice-aspects-de-procedure-penale.

Assemblée Nationale. “Projet de loi no 4091 pour la confiance dans l’institution judiciaire.” https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/textes/l15b4091_projet-loi.

Atlantico.fr. "45% des Français n’ont pas confiance en la justice.” March 28, 2017, https://atlantico.fr/article/pepite/45-des-francais-n-ont-pas-confiance-en-la-justice.

Atwill, Nicole. “European Court of Human Rights; France: Applicant’s Police Custody Rights Violated as Public Prosecutor Not Competent Legal Authority Under Article 5 § 3” Law Library of Congress. December 13, 2010. www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/european-court-of-human-rights-france-applicants-police-custody-rights-violated-as-public-prosecutor-not-competent-legal-authority-under-article-5-3/

Campbell, Alexia Fernández. “The Federal Government Markets Prison Labor to Businesses as the ‘Best-Kept Secret.’” Vox, August 24, 2018. https://www.vox.com/2018/8/24/17768438/national-prison-strike-factory-labor.

Commission Relative aux Droits de la Défense dans l’Enquête Pénale et au Secret Professionnel de l’Avocat. “Le Renforcement de l’Équilibre des Enquêtes Préliminaires et du Secret Professionnel de l’Avocat” https://www.dalloz-actualite.fr/sites/dalloz-actualite.fr/files/resources/2021/02/rapport_-_commission_mattei.pdf.

Delphine, Gotchaux et Mathilde, Lemaire. “Réforme de la justice : trois questions sur le projet de loi présenté par Éric Dupond-Moretti en conseil des ministres,” Franceinfo, April 14, 2021. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/justice/reforme-de-la-justice-trois-questions-sur-projet-de-loi-presente-par-eric-dupond-moretti-en-conseil-des-ministres_4370919.html

Gatinois, Claire, and Jacquin, Jean-Baptiste. “Eric Dupond-Moretti : « Les procès en laxisme sont intentés par les populistes extrémistes ».” Le Monde.fr, April 14, 2021. https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2021/04/14/eric-dupond-moretti-les-proces-en-laxisme-sont-intentes-par-les-populistes-extremistes_6076695_3224.html.
tps://www.gov.uk/government/news/cameras-to-broadcast-from-the-crown-court-for-first-time.

Harley, Georgia. “How Long Is Too Long? When Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied.” World Bank Blogs, March 25 2015.  https://blogs.worldbank.org/europeandcentralasia/how-long-too-long-when-justice-delayed-justice-denied

High Court of Australia. “Audio-Visual Recordings of Full Court Hearings in Canberra,” https://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/recent-av-recordings.

Jacqueline, Hodgson and Laurène, Soubise. “Prosecution in France” Oxford University Press, 2017. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2980309.

Miguel, João, José Ramos, Sara Domingos, and Rui Cardoso. “The Independence Of The Judiciary In The Democratic Balance Of The 21st Century,” 2018.

Reginia, Judge. “Cut! Arguments Against Televising Trials,” North East Journal of Legal Studies, 2014.

Sciences Po Cevipof. “En Quoi les Français ont-ils Confiance Aujourd’hui?- Vague 12”  Opinion Way, February, 2021 https://www.opinion-way.com/fr/sondage-d-opinion/sondages-publies/opinionway-pour-le-cevipof-barometre-de-la-confiance-en-politique-vague-12-fevrier-2021/viewdocument/2516.htm

Vie publique.fr. “Projet de loi pour la confiance dans l’institution judiciaire.” https://www.vie-publique.fr/loi/279445-loi-confiance-dans-linstitution-judiciaire-reforme-dupond-moretti.

Wu, Cindy and Brady, Prue. “Private Companies Producing with US Prison Labor in 2020: Prison Labor in the US, Part II”, Corporate Accountability Lab, August 5, 2020. https://corpaccountabilitylab.org/calblog/2020/8/5/private-companies-producing-with-us-prison-labor-in-2020-prison-labor-in-the-us-part-ii.

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Daniel Rodriguez Daniel Rodriguez

The Potentiality for Privacy Rights, Once and For All

Julia Filimowicz

By: Julia Filimowicz

Edited By: Anna Westfall and Luke Vredenburg

Imagine that amid a national security investigation, national intelligence agencies in conjunction with the government unilaterally take your private information to catch a suspect. This information is then shown to the government behind the closed doors of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and never disclosed to you. Due to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 2008 (FISA), warrantless seizure of Americans’ private information has become the norm in the era of the Internet and digitalization. This key provision, which amended the initial FISA passed in 1978, restricts intelligence agencies’ ability to collect foreign intelligence on non-Americans located outside of the United States, as Americans are protected by the 4th Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure.[1] Nonetheless, the law still enables agencies to sweep Americans’ communications while searching through foreign intelligence. The section gives the intelligence community the authority to target anybody who possesses “foreign intelligence information,” including journalists reporting on foreign governments, entrepreneurs expanding their businesses overseas, or even Americans calling loved ones abroad.[2] Since 2013, this “backdoor search loophole” and the unobtrusive secrecy of FISC has been contested by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in conjunction with other famous privacy advocates such as the Knight Amendment Foundation and Yale Law School’s Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic in the case ACLU v. the United States. 

Established in 1978, the FISC originally sought to review applications by the FBI to eavesdrop on targets suspected of being agents of a foreign power.[3] After September 1, 2001, Congress broadened the court’s power to consider broad surveillance programs, enabling FISC to issue secret search warrants for national security purposes.[4] Since then, only the ACLU has been remotely successful in determining what occurs behind closed doors of the FISC.

It is justifiable for the FISC to keep pushing away the ACLU’s investigation, as the plethora of issues that arise concerning the court’s procedures all pertain to the distortion in checks and balances between government branches. 

First, a significant proportion of judges currently on the FISA court were both previously employed in the executive branch and appointed by Republican presidents.[5] Since presidents appoint judges based on who they believe are willing to aid in pursuing their agenda, they have significant control over the ideology of the court. This is what law professors dub as the “loyalty effect”, where factors including ideology and personal relationship with the appointing president are taken into account [6]. A study carried by Supreme Court experts proved that members of the court make decisions favorable to the president who appointed them than subsequent presidents, even if they are from the same political party.[7] Therefore, skewing such an influential court that rules over national security interests is problematic, as debates concerning the safety of Americans are one-sided, leaving  space for bias. 

Second, the judges only hear the government’s requests and most targets will never know they were targeted or discussed in the courtroom. The formation of an exclusive executive branch-FISC conglomerate is corrosive to democracy, as American citizens have no say in the selection of agents that impact national security. This criticism is not to devalue the trust and responsibility entitled to the government to protect the American people. However, if it entails the warrantless search of private information of its citizens, the people have the right to know. 

Third, the passage of the USA Freedom Act in 2015 required that the government review any significant opinions for public release. This means that only executive branch officials, not the courts, determine what gets released to the public. This is a clear breach in the constitutional guarantee of a separation of powers between the branches of government. Furthermore, what is the purpose of praising the constitutional principles of American democracy of life, liberty, equality, and justice if the legal system contradicts them? A system that enables the obtainment of the private information of all Americans without their knowledge self-evidently violates such values.

Beginning in June 2013, the ACLU’s first motion requested that FISC publish its opinion on the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which authorized the bulk collection of Americans’ call records to the National Security Agency (NSA).[8] The motion was a result of whistleblower Edward Snowden disclosing a secret FISC order issued under Section 215 to compel Verizon to provide the NSA call records for every phone call placed on its network for three months.[9] It turned out that the order for the Verizon calls belonged to a much larger surveillance program that secretly existed for a decade and covered all major telephone companies.[10] Essentially, the phone records of all Americans were in the possession of the NSA for their convenience rather than out of national security interests. Consequently, the ACLU broadened its scope in its second motion in November 2013. The motion sought  opinions to dissect the legal basis for the record collection of the internet usage history, location information, and other data records collected from Americans under FISA.[11] The final motion issued in October 2016 —which is, controversially, being contested—petitioned for the disclosure of all FISC opinions containing “novel or significant interpretations” of law issued between 9/11 and the passage of the USA Freedom Act in June 2015.[12] In 2020, both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) and FISC held that they lack the jurisdiction to even consider the First Amendment public access motions which the ACLU filed. This brings attention to the most recent string of events in April 2021, during which the ACLU filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, asking the court to recognize the First Amendment right of public access to the FISC’s opinions with the redactions necessary to prevent genuine harm to national security.[13]  

When the case gained public attention once again in early November, the Biden administration pressured the Supreme Court into rejecting the appeal to hear post 9/11 FISC hearings. The administration claimed that not even the Supreme Court has the authority to review the case under federal law and that most of the material sought in the case had already been made public through requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).[14] However, this is a paradoxical claim, as the very first of the nine exemption categories in FOIA justifying the government withholding information is “classified information for national defense or foreign policy,” which grants the government the same loophole as in Section 702.[15] Furthermore, the administration claimed that there are other ways the ACLU could try to make information available.[16] The administration failed to realize, however, that no governing entity has the power to release such information from the FISC court besides the President, under executive privilege. 

An unusual allyship between the conservative Justice Neil Gorsuch and liberal Justice Sonia Sotomayor countered the administration’s arguments, claiming that they would have heard the case, as it “presents questions about the right of public access to ... judicial proceedings of grave national importance.”[17] Although it is self-evident that the ACLU will pursue this case until the victory of a baseline-privacy ruling is achieved, a key player is being kept dormant by higher powers. The first judge on the Supreme Court with a history of precedent-setting rulings on cyber law issues, Justice Sotomayor is notorious for her monumental concurring opinion in Jones v. the United States, in which she reconstructs privacy in the sense of intimacy rather than secrecy. Nevertheless, if the ACLU manages to work around the Biden administration and Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor’s cyber-legal expertise will force lawmakers to finally establish baseline privacy legislation that various civil rights and media groups have advocated for over the past twenty years.

Therefore, the FISC and Biden administration should expect the ACLU to persevere in their fight for the privacy rights of Americans, especially if it reaches the case docket of Justice Sotomayor. Given that there is not much precedent regarding the intersection of privacy and cybersecurity, Sotomayor’s pivotal concurring opinion in United States v. Jones may serve as the foundation for future policy and Supreme Court decisions.[18] In Jones, Sotomayor reconstructs privacy through her proposed privacy-as-intimacy test. She concurs that the invasion of privacy is unacceptable when it grants the government your intimate information-political, religious, sexual habits, and so on- without your consent. It should not be assumed that when one fails to conduct their affairs in secret, it enables the government to access all of their information.

The test outlines how a court should carry out an enforcement activity’s Fourth Amendment status. First, the court considers the comprehensiveness of the government activity in question. Then, it goes on to consider its precision and/or the extent to which it threatens to gather intimate information about the target’s life. Finally, the court considers whether the activity has been performed surreptitiously in addition to its corresponding lack of oversight by coordinate branches and consequent risk for abuse.[19] This test proves far more significant than the privacy-as-secrecy conception in Katz v. United States, which grants Fourth Amendment protection to all areas where a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy”.[20] Privacy as intimacy better pertains to the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in Oliver v. United States, which upholds the protection that is afforded to the curtilage of a home as most electronic interactions occur within the home.[21] 

Sotomayor’s privacy-as-intimacy test would serve as an extremely vital tool for the current case, as the abuses the government committed to gathering our private information concerns the issue of intimacy rather than secrecy. Given that the ACLU specifically requests for the redacted versions of significant FISC court opinions, it is imperative that Americans understand why their information is needed for national security investigations. Hence, if the ACLU manages to reach the Supreme Court, reintroducing this phenomenon may pave the way for baseline privacy laws that, for once, eliminate the numerous loopholes that grant the government leeway in accessing personal information. However, a significant obstacle is posed for the near future, as a Justice’s concurring opinion can not be used as a binding precedent. The ACLU will have to diligently lobby influential lawmakers and privacy experts to persuade the standstill Court and executive administration to finally grant the American people the right to privacy.

NOTES:

  1. Rainey Reitman, Andrew Crocker, and David Ruiz, “Decoding 702: What Is Section 702?,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, accessed November 5, 2021, https://www.eff.org/702-spying.

  2. Rainey Reitman et al., “Upstream vs. PRISM,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, October 19, 2017, https://www.eff.org/pages/upstream-prism. 

  3. “Supreme Court Rejects Appeal over Secretive Court's Work,” AP NEWS (Associated Press, November 1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/us-supreme-court-technology-government-surveillance-executive-branch-sonia-sotomayor-21333b8e6dd17072678b72ed2654d7da.

  4. “The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Its Judges ,” Judge Information Center (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) , August 9, 2013), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/327/. 

  5. Charlie Savage, “Roberts's Picks Reshaping Secret Surveillance Court” (The New York Times, July 26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/politics/robertss-picks-reshaping-secret-surveillance-court.html.

  6. Robert Barnes, “Justices Tend to Agree with Presidents That Pick Them - but Stray Later,” The Washington Post (WP Company, December 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-justices-are-loyal-to-their-presidents--they-stray-later/2015/12/20/0016886a-a5a1-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html.

  7. Ibid.

  8. “ACLU v. United States – First Amendment Right of Access to Secret Surveillance Court Decisions,” American Civil Liberties Union, June 3, 2021, https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-united-states-first-amendment-right-access-secret-surveillance-court-decisions.

  9. Ibid.

  10. Ibid.

  11. Ibid.

  12. Ibid.

  13. Ibid.

  14. “Supreme Court Rejects Appeal over Secretive Court's Work,” AP NEWS (Associated Press, November 1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/us-supreme-court-technology-government-surveillance-executive-branch-sonia-sotomayor-21333b8e6dd17072678b72ed2654d7da.

  15. “The Freedom of Information Act,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 5, 2021, https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx. 

  16. Lawrence Hurley, “U.S. Supreme Court Declines to Weigh Public Access to Surveillance Court Rulings,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, November 1, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-supreme-court-declines-weigh-public-access-surveillance-court-rulings-2021-11-01/.

  17. “Supreme Court Rejects Appeal over Secretive Court's Work,” AP NEWS (Associated Press, November 1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/us-supreme-court-technology-government-surveillance-executive-branch-sonia-sotomayor-21333b8e6dd17072678b72ed2654d7da.

  18. Orin Kerr, “Justice Sotomayor on Her Privacy Opinion: ‘Remember, I Was Only One of Nine.",” The Washington Post (WP Company, October 24, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/01/27/justice-sotomayor-on-her-privacy-opinion-remember-i-was-only-one-of-nine/.

  19. “10-1259 United States v. Jones” (Supreme Court, January 23, 2012), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1259.pdf.

  20. Michael B Kelley, “The Best Hope Left for Americans' Privacy Is This 2012 Supreme Court Opinion” (Business Insider, August 10, 2013), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-best-hope-left-for-american-privacy-2013-8. 

  21. “Oliver v. United States,” Oyez, November 9, 1983, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-15. 

Bibliography:

Reitman, Rainey, Andrew Crocker, and David Ruiz. “Decoding 702: What Is Section 702?” Electronic Frontier Foundation. Accessed November 5, 2021. https://www.eff.org/702-spying. 

Reitman, Rainey, Andrew Crocker, David Ruiz, and India McKinney. “Upstream vs. PRISM.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, October 19, 2017. https://www.eff.org/pages/upstream-prism. 

“Supreme Court Rejects Appeal over Secretive Court's Work.” AP NEWS. Associated Press, November 1, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/us-supreme-court-technology-government-surveillance-executive-branch-sonia-sotomayor-21333b8e6dd17072678b72ed2654d7da.  

“The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Its Judges .” Judge Information Center. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) , August 9, 2013. https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/327/.

Savage, Charlie. “Roberts's Picks Reshaping Secret Surveillance Court.” The New York Times, July 26, 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/politics/robertss-picks-reshaping-secret-surveillance-court.html.

Barnes, Robert. “Justices Tend to Agree with Presidents That Pick Them - but Stray Later.” The Washington Post. WP Company, December 20, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-justices-are-loyal-to-their-presidents--they-stray-later/2015/12/20/0016886a-a5a1-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html. 

“ACLU v. United States – First Amendment Right of Access to Secret Surveillance Court Decisions.” American Civil Liberties Union, June 3, 2021. https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-united-states-first-amendment-right-access-secret-surveillance-court-decisions.

“The Freedom of Information Act.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 5, 2021. https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx. 

Hurley, Lawrence. “U.S. Supreme Court Declines to Weigh Public Access to Surveillance Court Rulings.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, November 1, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-supreme-court-declines-weigh-public-access-surveillance-court-rulings-2021-11-01/. 

Kerr, Orin. “Justice Sotomayor on Her Privacy Opinion: ‘Remember, I Was Only One of Nine.".” The Washington Post. WP Company, October 24, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/01/27/justice-sotomayor-on-her-privacy-opinion-remember-i-was-only-one-of-nine/. 

“10-1259 United States v. Jones.” Supreme Court, January 23, 2012. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1259.pdf. 

Kelley, Michael B. “The Best Hope Left for Americans' Privacy Is This 2012 Supreme Court Opinion.” Business Insider, August 10, 2013. https://www.businessinsider.com/the-best-hope-left-for-american-privacy-2013-8. 

“Oliver v. United States.” Oyez, November 9, 1983. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-15.

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